The way that medical and ward services are provided in healthcare environments (HCEs) may be characterized as 'patient-centric'. This means that every new patient initiates a new case. Such a case consists of a different number of particular tasks according to the initial and current patient needs for care. As a result, a patient's case is the main target of a group of doctors and nurses qualified to play specific roles in order to provide their services efficiently. During their work, the users (doctors and nurses) are supported by the IT infrastructure of the HCE. Access to sensitive personal and medical patient data is controlled by the accesscontrol system of the healthcare information system (HIS). However, in order to provide an access-control system that supports variable access authorizations without being intrusive to medical staff and without introducing additional administrative overheads, there is a need for an access control model that incorporates the advantages of role-based permission administration, provided in RBAC [1], together with a fine-grained control of individual user permissions activation.
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In this paper, an implementation approach of an access-control system that is based on the C-TMAC model and developed with ORACLE DBMS is presented. The access-control system exploits the advanced mechanism of Dynamic SQL in order to apply the authorization process during the runtime and provides view-based protection, as demonstrated with a simple case in a healthcare environment. A detailed description of setting up the corresponding access rules and an implementation paradigm of the accesscontrol process that takes place in the presence of a user access request are presented to prove the flexibility and efficiency of the proposed approach.
HEALTHCARE CHARACTERISTICS AFFECTING ACCESS CONTROL
An important aspect of access-control mechanisms, recently introduced in the area of research, has to do with their active or passive character. The majority of well-known security models are characterized as passive in the sense that they include subject-object models for accesscontrol, which are implemented using access control matrices, as well as lattice-based access controls. These models do not distinguish between permission assignment and activation. According to Thomas [2] however, an important security objective for clinical workflows associated with patient care is the ability to provide very tight, just-in-time permissions so that only the appropriate clinical staff can access Programming a view-based active access-control system for healthcare environments
C. K. Georgiadis, I. K. Mavridis and G. I. Pangalos
Modern healthcare information systems need active security mechanisms that are capable of controlling access to medical data, according to the current need-to-know requirements of users. An access-control model that fits the above requirements is the already known C-TMAC (Context-based Team Access Control) model, which incorporates active security features and provides tight and just-in-time management of user permissions. In this paper, an implementation approach of an access control system that is based on the C-TMAC model is proposed. To further enforce fine-grained access control, we adopt view-based protection that permits the use of flexible granularities to define the objects to be protected. For this purpose, a simple case in a healthcare environment is assumed and a detailed description of setting up the corresponding access rules in a view-based fashion is presented. An implementation paradigm of the access control process that takes place on the presence of a user request is demonstrated.
INTRODUCTION
For the protection of sensitive personal data stored in medical database systems from unauthorized access it is important to ensure that access to the medical record is allowed only to authorized users. However, classical access-control models are characterized as passives because they do not adapt to the particular application and environmental parameters that affect the need-to-know requirements of users. a patient's records and only when they are providing care for the patient, without adding any significant administrative overhead. As a result, there is a need for access control based on the emerging context associated with tasks and activities, which may include the particular patient, the location of the activity and the moment when access requests are submitted.
Passive security models are those that primarily support the function of maintaining permissions assignments, as in role-based ones, where permissions are assigned to roles. On the other hand, active security models approach security enforcement from the perspective of activities and therefore provide the mechanisms for the runtime management of security as tasks progress to completion. In a passive model, once permissions are assigned to a user, it is always assumed that they will be activated independently of any other considerations such as context. On the contrary, in active models after permissions are assigned, they may be activated and deactivated several times in accordance with the evolving context associated with progressing tasks [2] .
Another essential issue for access-control management in HCEs is their co-operative nature. HCEs are an example of a collaborative environment since the individuals in many cases do not act in isolation, but collaborate to provide care to patients in a more efficient way. Moreover, there is a significant turnover of the personnel, as for example doctors, nurses and trainees, which undertake rotations in each of the different departments and units. Workflow tasks often tend to be ad hoc with several users joining and leaving one or more teams in an unpredictable way. As a result, user authentication and authorization procedures become burdensome in such situations [3] . In order to deal with these problems, the C-TMAC model has already been proposed [4] , efficiently supporting and handling the concepts and structures of care teams.
AN OVERVIEW OF THE C-TMAC MODEL
C-TMAC is an active security access control model that integrates role-based (RBAC) and team-based (TMAC) access-control models and extends them in the sense that contextual information concerning collaborative activities is associated with teams of users. In pure rolebased models, the simple role concept is used as follows: security officers establish permissions based on the functional roles in the organization and then appropriately assign users to a role or set of roles [1] [5] . This approach offers significant advantages since the workload of security administrators is reduced. On the other hand, because the TMAC model is an active security model, it is capable of supporting access authorizations that are changing dynamically according to the context information of the collaborative tasks of users.
This context information depends on the specific characteristics of the environment wherein the C-TMAC model is applied. For example, in an HCE all clinical tasks could be defined during the runtime and based on the following factors [4] : q patient: a user gains additional permissions for a specific patient in their care. q location: the collaborative activity depends on the specific area wherein the users of a particular team are working. q time: all permissions are valid during a certain time (periodic) interval.
As roles provide a well-organized way of managing the various user responsibilities, teams can provide analogous methods for managing the contexts for various user activities and serving administrative purposes [6] . This context-based approach of teams results in flexible team-based access control policies.
SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The access-control system we have developed provides authentication and authorization services for either conventional local applications or networked and certificate-based systems [7] . The architecture of the implemented access-control system is comprised of two major components:
q An administration module for designing, specifying and maintaining the components of a specific implementation of the C-TMAC model. q An end-user module that enforces all C-TMAC security considerations to control user interactions with the medical database.
The administration module
This module provides a user-friendly interface for facilitating the authorization specification process, according to the characteristics of the C-TMAC model. It allows users (security officers) to inquire, create, update and delete the entities and relations defined in the C-TMAC model. In more detail, the application menu includes administration operations on the following components of the C-TMAC model:
q Users (U), roles (R), permissions (P), teams (T) and contexts (C) q User-to-role assignment (URS relation) q Permission-to-role assignment (PRS relation) q User-to-team assignment (UTS relation) q Context-to-team assignment (CTS relation). Since our pilot implementation of C-TMAC model deals with healthcare environments, context-to-team assignment is derived from:
-patients-to-teams assignment -locations-to-teams assignment -timezones-to-teams assignment.
The end-user module
This module provides a Web interface that allows users to identify and authenticate themselves, to activate roles and teams in order to obtain the appropriate sets of permissions, to place their access request and finally to receive responses from the access control system.
RELATED TECHNOLOGIES
The developed access-control system provides Web-based computing capabilities to access real-time data stored in medical databases. Users are able to execute queries against the database, while the Web-server has to retrieve live data from the database server and return information to the Web-browser formatted as a dynamically generated hypertext markup language (HTML) document. In particular, our access-control system exploits the capabilities of the Oracle application server (OAS), which functions as the middle tier of Oracle's three-tier computing model. According to this model, because of issues related to scalability, maintenance and connection persistence [8] , an application or middle-tier server is situated between the client (Web-browser) and the back-end (database server) tiers, providing so an additional layer of independence and functionality.
The developed access-control system is based on the Oracle object-relational database management system. Thus, the objects of protection are relations, tuples, attributes and views using modes of access operations such as SELECT, INSERT and UPDATE. The permissions of users are then defined as data views (e.g. by using the SELECT statement of the Structured Query Language -SQL). Using views of the relational model results in a view-based protection model [9] . A significant advantage of this definition is the use of flexible granularities to define the objects to be protected [10] . It is thus easy to introduce detailed specifications of specific items (e.g. fields), as well as more general declarations for coarser groups of datasets (e.g. tables) in order to save storage space.
Management of storing and retrieving data with ORACLE DBMS is performed using the well-known SQL. Additional procedural logic is provided with procedures written in Java and PL/SQL. However, for the implementation of the C-TMAC model we used another important characteristic of the ORACLE DBMS, which is called Dynamic SQL. Dynamic SQL statements are not embedded in source programs but they are stored in character strings that are input to, or built by, the program at runtime. This feature allows system designers to create procedures of more general purpose. For example, using Dynamic SQL is permissible to create pieces of code that operate on a table whose name is not known until runtime. The ability to use Dynamic SQL from within stored procedures generally follows the model of the Oracle Call Interface [8] . Any data manipulation language (DML) or data definition language (DDL) statement can be parsed. However, the most powerful characteristic of using Dynamic SQL is the ability to bind values to variables of a SQL statement during the runtime. This makes it possible to define DML statements that contain input data to be supplied at runtime.
In the implementation example that is presented below, placeholders are used in SQL statements to mark where data must be supplied. These placeholders hold all the necessary information for supporting access control decisions according to the C-TMAC model. More precisely, to examine the validity of a specific user access request, SQL statements that contain placeholders for both access request information (such as current time and location of the user) and healthcare team contextual information (such as sets of locations, times and patients) is parsed. These contextual values are useful during the filtering process of the C-TMAC model.
EXAMPLE APPLICATION SCENARIO
In our example scenario we assume the presence of the following tables in the experimental medical database:
Users are categorized in different roles (such as 'physician', 'head nurse', etc.), according to their qualifications and to their responsibilities. Moreover, they participate in various care teams (such as emergency care teams, cardiology care teams etc.), in order to collaborate, improving in that way the quality of provided services.
We assume that a user with the role 'research doctor' asks for specific information (disease description and responsible doctor), concerning the prescriptions recorded in the database for a particular patient. The final set of access rights of this user is not only determined from the permissions of the 'research doctor' role that has been assigned, but also from the user's participation in a particular care team. Assuming that the user is a member of a specific emergency care team, then the access rights of this team depend on the roles of the members currently participating. In our example, we assume that when a user places an access request, team-mates are holding 'physician' and 'head nurse' roles.
The application logic of the developed access control system is described in more detail in the following subsections.
Permissions
In this example, the roles of physician, head nurse and research doctor provide sets of role permissions for accessing the experimental medical database. These permissions can be expressed in SQL form as follows:
Head nurses cannot access personal data of very important persons ( ). Moreover, research doctors need to access medical data related only to HIV disease.
Contexts
Assuming that context parameters for clinical tasks are the patient-IDs (field PAcode in PATIENT table), the current time and the current location of the users, then the context of a team can be stored in the corresponding variables SetOfPatients, TimeZones and SetOfLocations, wherein are placed the sets of actual values regarding charged patient codes, work time zones and responsibility locations, respectively. In our example, we assume an emergency room care team (ER-T1). Possible locations of users could be ER-L1, ER-L2, LAB-L1, GLAB2 and DOS-L1, each standing for corresponding emergency rooms, laboratories and doctors' offices. Then the context assigned to the ER-T1 team, could be expressed as follows:
This context can be expressed as a WHERE clause that is going to be added subsequently to the view definition (SQL statement) of the role-based permissions in order to filter them:
Combination
Let us now assume that two users have started their sessions and activated the roles physician and head nurse respectively. They also chose to participate in the ER-T1 team. At this moment, the current set of roles in ER-T1 team, is {Physician, Head Nurse}. The rolebased permissions of ER-T1 team members determined as the combination of the permissions of the participating roles, as depicted below:
Continuing our example, we assume a third user (TEST1) is starting a new session, activating the role research doctor and participating in the ER-T1 team. As a result, the current set of roles in team ER-T1 becomes {Physician, Head Nurse, Research Doctor}.
According to the proposed procedure for defining the team-roles permissions and using the aggregation method (see above) to combine role-based permissions (the symbol ⊕ is replaced by the symbol ∪ that means union), the set of role-based permissions of the third user is derived as follows:
In our example application, user TEST1 places an access request concerning 
Filtering
The final set of context-based permissions of this user (namely dataset1) is derived with the following statement that filters the combined role-based permissions as follows:
The context parameter of patient-IDs has to be treated in a different way than the other two condition parameters (time and location). That is because each data table in the experimental medical database is related in a different way to the patient-IDs. In the above example, PRESCRIPTION 
Access control
Let assume now that the third user decides to place the following access request: The process of access control that follows includes two steps. First, the set of role-based and context-based permissions of the third user is derived ({dataset-1}), since CurrentTime and CurrentLocation variables contain specific values. Second, the access-control system compares and examines whether the set of results to be provided ({dataset-2}) is included (IN clause of SQL) in the final set of context-based permissions ({dataset-1}). In this example, the third user gains access and their request is satisfied, because all relative parameters of their specific access request belong to the contextual information of ER-T1 team. If at least one of the parameters CurrentTime, CurrentLocation, CurrentPatientID, has a value that is outside of the range of the ER-T1 team context then the request is denied.
AN IMPLEMENTATION PARADIGM
In our implementation approach, both the alternative types of identification and authentication services are supported: applicationlevel with locally controlled login information consisted of pairs of username and password and network-level with distributed control and certificate-based schemas. Authorizationbinding is also supported in both cases.
The end-user places their data access request with an appropriate query in SQL (Fig. 1 ) along with their role and team authorizations, which is their sessiondependent profile. Subsequently, the C-TMAC access-control system computes the team authorizations, which are derived by combining the role-based permissions of the current team members, and generates the final permission set that is depended on the current team context information as well as the time and the location of the user access request.
The result pages are dynamically generated from the C-TMAC access-control procedures using the Web-oriented package of the Oracle Application Server [11] . An example of such a Web page containing the query results of a successful access request is presented in Fig. 2 . It is actually the system response on the access request presented in Fig. 1 . For demonstrative purposes, all result pages that are presented in this paper contain additional informative sections. This detailed information concerns the current values of system variables, as well as the related SQL statement placeholders, and it describes the runtime status of the C-TMAC mechanisms in use.
Authorization data
In Figure 2 , the Status section presents the current values of the major factors concerning a particular user access request: when (current time), from where (current location), who (current user), using which role (current role) and participating in which team (current team), if any. The Status section presents also the current access request query.
In the next section, additional information concerning the current team membership is presented: which users and under which roles they are currently working in the same team. After that, a description of the particular team context follows. That is, the valid conditions (locations and time zones) and the actual set of patients which is treated by this specific healthcare team.
Access control
Finally, the actual form of the access request in progress is presented, as it has been modified by the C-TMAC mechanisms in order to take into consideration all the necessary considerations. More specifically, the SQL form of the access request is extended by using a WHERE clause, in order to express the appropriate access request context. A particular security table, called CONTEXTS, is used to store all the contextual information of every user's session. In more detail, CNusname, CNpatcode, CNloccode, CNstime and CNetime fields of CONTEXTS table, hold username, patient codes, location codes and time periods (starting time and ending time) respectively. As shown in Fig. 2 , the access request query has been modified as follows:
Expressions ':unm', ':cl', ':ct', ':t1' and ':t2' stand for the previously mentioned placeholder variables, which mark where data must be supplied during the runtime. The variable ':unm' is used to define dynamically the user who requests access, the variable ':cl' specifies the location of the access request and the variables ':ct', ':t1' and ':t2' define the current time and the time zone, correspondingly. By calling the BIND_VARIABLE procedure as follows, it is permissible to bind the appropriate values to these variables of the SQL statement (modified access request): The variable ':cu_cursql' holds (as a character string) the SQL statement. The variable ':ucode' holds the user name of current user. Variables ':stime' and ':etime' are bound with values coming from CONTEXTS table. Finally, the modified access request query that is executed is:
Therefore, the data shown in Fig. 2 refer only to those patients who belong to the current team ER-T1 of the user TEST1. 
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented an approach for developing an active access-control system based on the C-TMAC model for healthcare environments. The development of the accesscontrol system has been based on the Oracle object-relational database management system and exploits the advanced characteristics of Dynamic SQL to store in appropriate data values concerning the contextual information of user tasks during the runtime. Using SQL statements to apply view-based control provides significant advantages that include the use of flexible mechanisms to control appropriately the protection level of sensitive medical data.
The resulting access-control system is user friendly because of the Web interface provided and is also flexible and dynamically tuned to the runtime needs. The experimental implementation of the proposed access control system unveils significant capabilities in modelling and implementing permission activation mechanisms in a flexible manner, so as to meet the needs of collaborative environments, such as the healthcare environments.
